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Assessing the Long-term Effects of Conditional Cash 
Transfers on Human Capital: Evidence from Colombia
* 
 
Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) are programs under which poor families get a stipend 
provided they keep their children in school and take them for health checks. While there is 
significant evidence showing that they have positive impacts on school participation, little is 
known about their long-term impacts on human capital. In this paper we investigate whether 
cohorts of children from poor households that benefited up to nine years from Familias en 
Acción, a CCT in Colombia, attained more school and performed better in academic tests at 
the end of high school. Identification of program impacts is derived from two different 
strategies using matching techniques with household surveys, and regression discontinuity 
design using census of the poor and administrative records of the program. We show that, on 
average, participant children are 4 to 8 percentage points more likely than nonparticipant 
children to finish high school, particularly girls and beneficiaries in rural areas. Regarding 
long-term impact on tests scores, the analysis shows that program recipients who graduate 
from high school seem to perform at the same level as equally poor non-recipient graduates, 
even after correcting for possible selection bias when low-performing students enter school in 
the treatment group. Even though the positive impacts on high school graduation may 
improve the employment and earning prospects of participants, the lack of positive effects on 
the test scores raises the need to further explore policy actions to couple CCT’s objective of 
increasing human capital with enhanced learning. 
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As part of the global efforts to promote universal basic education, a number of programs 
have been put in place with positive effects on school enrollment and attendance. Existing 
evidence shows that the use of educational services responds positively to interventions such as 
school construction, hiring of additional teachers, regular de-worming of children, school 
feeding, take-home ration schemes, school vouchers, and conditional and unconditional cash 
transfers. In particular, Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs), programs that transfer money to 
poor families contingent on specific education and health behaviors, have been on the rise in 
recent years. Since 1997, more than 30 countries have adopted CCTs with the goals of reducing 
poverty and encouraging investments in human capital. A recent review of the impact evaluation 
literature indicates that all 11 CCTs evaluated against school enrollment and 15 CCTs evaluated 
against attendance have positive effects (World Bank, 2010). However, this may not be 
surprising since most of these programs are conditional upon school outcomes. 
 
CCTs’ impacts on poor children’s school participation are expected to lead to higher 
educational attainment. If students stay in school and progress, they could accumulate more 
human capital and enjoy higher future incomes. Additionally if conditionality of attendance to 80 
percent of the classes is higher than the average attendance with no program, this might be 
reflected in stronger educational performance and also higher future productivity. Furthermore, 
the transfers of CCTs may increase household’s disposable income and their spending towards 
activities that are beneficial for students’ learning, such as foods, books and other school 
supplies. This additional income together with the conditions to keep children in school are also 
expected to reduce the pressure for eligible children to work so they can spend more time on 
school-related activities. Finally, the value that the program places on education could be 
transferred to the families, enhancing their attitude toward the importance of investing in the 
schooling of children. Positive peer influence that the CCT beneficiaries receive as they attend 
classes could also encourage them to study harder and pursue higher education.   
 
Nevertheless, although increased children’s school enrollment and time in school are 
important inputs for the formation of human capital, they do not automatically translate into 
attainment of more education and improved learning outcomes. First, if the school supply 3 
 
remains fixed, schools may get congested due to the rise in enrollment, increasing teacher pupil 
ratios and overcrowding in the classroom. Second, the marginal children who are brought into 
school by the transfers and conditions of the program could have lower expected returns to 
school compared to those already enrolled since they may be, for instance, less motivated, come 
from lower socio-economic background, and have less capacity or time devoted to school work. 
Another plausible reason for limited effects on school attainment and performance is that CCTs 
are often geographically targeted to poor areas where the teaching and school quality may be 
relatively lower. Despite the substantial amount of work devoted to assessing the educational 
impacts of CCTs, little is known about their long-term effects on the stock of human capital, i.e. 
educational attainment and academic performance in early adulthood. 
 
This paper seeks to help fill in this knowledge gap and identify the expected but empirically 
uncertain link between school participation and educational achievement through an evaluation 
of the long-term educational impacts of a Conditional Cash Transfer program in Colombia. More 
specifically, we investigate whether multiple cohorts of children who are covered by Familias en 
Acción (FA) and who have different degrees of program exposure (ranging from one to nine 
years) complete more years of education –measured by the probability of completing high 
school– and perform better in a national standardized test at the end of high school. Although 
these are not necessarily final outcomes since they do not reflect the ultimate educational 
achievement, they are close determinants of human welfare and economic growth. In addition, 
we examine whether there is heterogeneity in program impacts by location (urban and rural) and 
by the gender of child. Finally, this paper explores possible indirect effects on the human capital 
of older children (18 years and older) who by the rules of the program are ineligible to the 
transfer but who reside in households with younger participant children.  
 
Identification of program impacts is derived from two different empirical strategies that use a 
panel of household surveys, a census of the poor and administrative data from the information 
system of Familias en Acción. The first research design employs matching techniques to 
compare the school completion rates and test scores of different cohorts of children from 
treatment and control areas that could have finished high school during the program 
implementation period of 2003-2009 and were interviewed prior to the initiation of the program. 
The second design exploits variation in assignment to treatment arising from the sharp 4 
 
discontinuity that emerges at the eligibility threshold defined to participate in the program. 
Household are assigned a poverty index score from a census of poor people, which determines 
their eligibility into different social programs (including FA) with different thresholds.  
 
We show that the program helps participant children to increase their school attainment by 
making them more likely to complete high school. Results from the first empirical approach 
(matching analysis) indicate that program effects vary between 4 and 8 percentage points. The 
RD approach yields estimates of program effects on school completion that are similar in 
direction and magnitude. Overall, focusing on the preferred specifications, we estimate that 
beneficiary children that belong to households near the threshold of eligibility are between 3 and 
6.5 percentage points more likely to graduate from high school. There is also evidence of 
heterogeneity in program impacts, with effects on school completion being larger for girls and 
beneficiaries in rural areas. Regarding long-term impacts on tests scores, the analysis shows that 
program recipients who graduate from high school perform at the same level as equally poor 
non-recipient graduates in Mathematics, Spanish, or the overall test. This result still holds after 
correcting for possible selection bias when low-performing students enter school in the treatment 
group. Finally, there is no indication of indirect program effects on the school completion of 
ineligible older children residing in the same households as participant children. The results are 
robust to a variety of controls for observable differences between participants and non-
participants, the possibility of sorting around the threshold of eligibility or manipulation of the 
proxy-means test used to allocate the program, misspecification bias, and differences in the 
accuracy of data that could lead to spurious differences in test registration between treated and 
control children.  
 
This paper is structured in five chapters in addition to this introduction. The second chapter 
reviews the relevant literature regarding the impacts of CCTs, including previous evidence on 
FA, and provides an overview of the program. Chapter three describes the data sources used in 
the paper. The fourth chapter presents the empirical analysis, including the discussion of the two 
different research designs, results from the models on program impacts, the heterogeneity of 
program impacts and the indirect effects of the program on nonparticipating adolescents who live 
in the same households as participant children.  Chapter five discusses robustness checks to 
ensure that the findings of the analysis are not subject to selection, misspecification, or data 5 
 
matching bias. Chapter six concludes with different interpretations of the results as well s the 




2.1 Existing Literature 
 
There is large amount of evidence demonstrating that CCTs encourage households to 
increase the use of educational services. Impact evaluations of programs implemented in an array 
of countries including Brazil, Cambodia, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Malawi, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, and Turkey indicate that, by and large, CCTs lead to immediate 
increases in school enrollment and attendance (World Bank, 2010). Even though the size of the 
impacts varies with the features of each program (amount of the transfers, types of 
conditionalities, target groups, timing of payments), the characteristics of the population (age, 
gender, school grade, socioeconomic status, location), and the conditions of program areas 
(school supply and baseline enrollment), the direction of program effects is largely consistent 
across programs and evaluation methods. A subset of these evaluations also tracked the school 
progression of participant children relative to control children, relying mostly on data that span 
two years of initial program participation. The large majority of these studies show positive 
impacts in indicators such as grade progression, grade repetition, and dropout rates. However, it 
is important to stress that these effects are more prominent among children in primary education, 
and say little about the actual accumulation of human capital in later stages of life. 
 
The evidence is scant when it comes to the impacts of CCTs on final (or close to final) 
outcomes in education. Looking at school completion, existing evidence from Pakistan shows 
that CCT beneficiaries are more likely to complete secondary school by 4 to 6 percentage points 
(Alam et al., 2010). Barrera-Osorio et al. (2008) evaluated a pilot version of a CCT program 
implemented in Bogota (Colombia), called Subsidios, and found similar results.
2
                                                           
2 The Subsidios program was implemented in the late 2000´s in Bogotá and targeted vulnerable population classified as Sisben 
level 1 and Sisben 2 based on the proxy-means test constructed with information from a census of the poor. The program’s 
transfers and conditions are similar to Familias en Acción, which is a nationwide and older program. However, the Subsidios 
program offered two other treatments with a different structure of benefits. One is the “savings treatment,” which reserves one 
third of the bimonthly payment to be given to families as a lump sum at the end of the year, just before enrollment into the 
subsequent grade level. The other is the “tertiary treatment,” which also reserves part of the bimonthly payment, but then pays 
families a substantially larger amount if students graduate from high school (eleventh grade). Students who continue to tertiary 
education are eligible to receive that amount one year earlier than those who do not. These two additional treatments may change 
 As for actual 6 
 
school attainment, only evaluations of Oportunidades in Mexico (previously known as Progresa) 
has measured the impact on rural adolescents who were old enough to have plausibly completed 
their schooling after at least five and a half years of benefits. A first study found that children 
with exposure to the benefits of approximately two years or more achieve about 0.2 grades of 
additional schooling (Behrman et al., 2005). Subsequent studies that look at the impacts on 
young adults with longer periods of exposure to the benefits of Oportunidades (nearly 10 years) 
show important increases in grades of schooling achieved by program participants and their labor 
insertion, but no effects on the proportion of high school graduates going to college (Behrman 
and Parker, 2008; Freije and Rodriguez, 2008).
3
 
 Results from evaluations of programs in 
Cambodia and Honduras point to similar effects, yet they are estimated through simulation 
analysis or on samples of younger children who were still in school (Filmer and Schady, 2009; 
Glewwe and Olinto, 2004). 
Similarly, the evidence of program effects on learning outcomes is limited and somewhat 
mixed, making it difficult to draw conclusions. Improvements in cognitive development 
attributed to CCTs have been consistently found only for young children in pre-school and 
primary education. The existing literature does not find a discernible effect on learning outcomes 
for older children when tested during the final grades of secondary school. This is probably due 
partly to practical and empirical difficulties in revisiting treatment and control children long after 
a program has been implemented. Furthermore, an evaluation of learning could be confounded 
by selection problems. Evaluations that estimate program effects based on tests given to children 
in school may be confounded by selection problems because the beneficiary and non-beneficiary 
children that go to school are probably not comparable. The “marginal child” that attends school 
thanks to the program may be poorer and of lower ability compared to those already enrolled. 
Behrman et al. (2000), for example, investigate the effects of Oportunidades in Mexico on the 
academic achievement of children in school, a sample prone to suffer from nonrandom selection. 
To address this, the analysis reweights the data to align the age and sex distributions of the 
treatment and control groups and finds that there is no effect on test scores after 1.5 years of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the way families respond to the program in two ways: one is due to the reduction in the amount of cash families receive on a 
bimonthly basis, therefore limiting their liquidity; another is through the incentives created by linking cash transfers directly to 
grade progression and matriculation in tertiary education.  
3 It is worth noting that the results of these two papers are not generalizable to the entire population covered by Oportunidades 
given that the samples of analysis only contain non-migrant rural households. Migrants are expected to have higher enrollment in 
college and better job opportunities, including higher salaries. 7 
 
exposure to the program. In contrast, evidence based on matching techniques from a scholarship 
program in Argentina, which operated as a CCT, shows that the program improved student 
performance as measured by school grades (Heinrich, 2007). Among analyses that do not 
condition on school enrollment to avoid contamination due to compositional changes, the results 
show that CCT beneficiaries in secondary school do not do better in academic tests given at 





Recent evidence specific to the impacts of FA on learning among young students in primary 
and middle-secondary school provides mixed results. To account for the problem of selection, 
García and Hill (2009) focus on the impacts on school progression and academic achievement 
for the students who would have been enrolled in school even in the absence of the program.
5 
While fifth graders in the treatment group did better in math and language tests than those in the 
control group, particularly in rural areas, program effects for ninth graders in both subjects are 
negative. Yet, the validity of the findings of this paper is limited for at least two reasons. First, if 
program effects do exist, they are probably difficult to identify due to the lack of enough 
statistical power in their analysis. Sample sizes for the nonparametric models of the paper are 
very low, ranging from 100 to 300 observations depending on the age groups. Second, and 
perhaps more troublesome, the nationally administered tests used by the authors to infer the 
academic performance of children (known as “Pruebas Saber”) are only representative at the 




This paper seeks to contribute to the understanding of the effects of CCTs on school 
completion and learning outcomes by early adulthood. In particular, this study adds to the 
existing literature in three ways. First, the analysis focuses on the dynamics of program impacts 
in the long run as it tracks different cohorts of treatment children who have been in the program 
from one to nine years. Most of the few studies that measure program effects on intermediate and 
final outcomes in education did so with children who have been exposed to the treatment for no 
                                                           
4. Results from Behrman and Parker (2008) actually show some positive trends in math and reading tests for program participants. 
Results on math achievement tests are however limited by low sample sizes.  The analysis on reading tests is based on single 
differences between program participants, which according to the authors, could underestimate the actual impacts of the program.  
5 Treated children were then matched to children in the control group based on the propensity to stay in school, derived from 
those in the control group that were enrolled both before and after program implementation. 
6 Schools could be comprised of children that take the test and others that do not take the test.  8 
 
longer than two years. Second, we use three different data sources and samples (the baseline 
survey of the evaluation of the program from 2002, the program’s information system, and a 
census of poor households) to perform two different methodological approaches which allows 
for a comparison of the findings across methodologies. Additionally, by using data from the 
program’s information system for impact evaluation purposes, this paper highlights the 
opportunities for research that may arise from using monitoring and evaluation systems, as these 
are becoming increasingly popular tools to administer CCTs and other safety net programs. 
Finally, this paper also investigates the extent to which the final educational outcomes of older 
children that are not eligible to the program could be influenced by the participation of their 
siblings.  
 
2.2 The Program 
 
In the late 1990s, Colombia was hit by its worst economic downturn in 60 years: GDP shrank 
by 4.5 percent in 1999 alone, and the national poverty rate increased by 7.2 percentage points, 
largely erasing the socio-economic gains made during the early 1990s (World Bank, 2005 and 
2008). A team was put together to address the social dimensions of the crisis from the 
government of Colombia, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. One of 
the safety net programs was Familias en Acción (FA), designed as an instrument to help mitigate 
the effects of the economic crisis on the wellbeing of poor households and protect and promote 
human capital formation. FA was inspired by the CCT Oportunidades in Mexico, and consists of 
subsidies to education, nutrition, and health subsidies conditional on specific behaviors 
associated with school participation and attendance to health checks. The program was piloted in 
a few municipalities in 2001, but was scaled up in the second half of 2002 in the context of great, 




                                                           
7 Net enrollment rates for children aged 7-11 (primary school) increased from 77 to 93 percent from 1992 to 2002, and from 40 to 
57 percent for those in the 12-17 age group (secondary school) (UNESCO, Institute for Statistics). The average educational 
attainment of people 15 years and older increased from 6.4 years in 1992 to 7.6 years in 2003. This is still low, however, when 
compared with other countries in the region such as Argentina (8.8 years) and Panama (8.6 years) (World Bank, 2005 & 2008). 
In terms of school completion, the numbers had not changed significantly since the beginning of the 1990s. At the pre-program 
time, still only 60 percent of children who started primary school finished fifth grade, while 57 percent of those who began 
secondary school finished ninth grade and only 35 percent completed eleventh grade, that is, high school (García and Hill, 2009; 
World Bank, 2008).  9 
 
The largest component of the program is educational conditional cash transfers. Households 
with children aged 7-18 receive a monthly grant per child, conditional on the child attending to at 
least 80 percent of school lessons. When the program started, the  grant was  $12,000 pesos 
(approximately $7) for each child attending primary school (grades 1-5) and $24,000 pesos ($14) 
for those in secondary school (grades 6-11). The level of benefits was set to compensate for the 
direct cost borne by low-income families to send their children to school.
8
 
 In some urban areas, 
the subsidies were increased to accommodate the higher opportunity cost of secondary education 
in the cities, and the subsidies for primary school students were replaced by nutritional subsidies 
for children 7-11 years old due to almost full enrollment in urban areas (Acción Social, 2010a). 
Like the Oportunidades program, the transfers are specifically given to mothers, a mechanism 
designed to ensure that the money is invested in children and as an incentive for empowering 
women within their communities. 
Within each municipality FA targets the poorest households based on a proxy-means test 
system constructed with information from a census of poor people (known as Sisben). In 
Colombia, all households surveyed by Sisben are assigned to one of six brackets of a poverty 
index score called Sisben that is used to identify the most vulnerable population. The index runs 
from 0 to 100, and it is a function of a set of household characteristics and variables related to the 
consumption of durable goods, human capital endowments, and current income to calculate a 
score that indicates the household economic well-being. The first level includes households that 
are extremely poor. While many social programs target the population with scores falling in the 
first two brackets, FA is only offered to households in the first bracket. Municipal governments 
are responsible for ensuring adequate coordination with schools and health centers working with 
the FA program to ensure its successful local implementation.
9
                                                           
8 After a first expansion in 2005, the grant was increased to $14,000 pesos and $28,000 pesos, respectively. The latest change in 
2007 brought the grant to corresponding $15,000 pesos and $30,000 pesos, merely keeping up with inflation. 
 Local banks deliver the cash 
transfers to beneficiaries every two months.  It was estimated that the annual costs of the 
program in 2009 were going to be equivalent to 0.27 percent of GDP in that year (World Bank, 
2008). 
9  Municipalities prepare the list of families to receive the subsidies (Sisben  level 1 families with children 18 years old or 
younger). The list is consolidated from municipalities every three years. The subsidies are also contingent on verification of 
compliance with the conditions that involves beneficiary mothers obtaining attendance certificates from schools every two 
months and delivering them to the municipal coordination office, who then sends that information to the regional and finally the 




The program FA expanded over the years to reach national coverage in 2010. Initially, the 
program was targeted geographically. Only municipalities that were not departmental capitals, 
with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants, with at least one bank branch working in the municipality, 
and had access to facilities that allowed for the implementation of the program were eligible (691 
out of the 1,024 municipalities). Within these communities, a total of 340,000 households in 622 
municipalities were registered to participate (Attanasio et al., 2006). In 2005, the program was 
extended to include displaced families and households in departmental capitals and 
municipalities which either became able to offer the required services or with services accessible 
in nearby towns. Most recently, during 2007, the program expanded to municipalities with more 
than 100,000 inhabitants to include other deprived urban areas. The program now covers nearly 
2.8 million participating households in 1,093 municipalities, representing almost 65 percent of 
the target population (Acción Social, 2010b; Attanasio et al., 2009).  
 
An early evaluation of FA demonstrated positive effects on short-term outcomes such as 
household consumption and children’s school participation and nutrition status. Indeed, within 
the first two years of program implementation, household consumption increased by 13-15 
percent, school enrollment rates increased by around 5 to7 and  2 percentage points for children 
in secondary and primary schools, respectively, child labor participation fell by around 10 to 12 
percentage points, and health and nutrition outcomes such as morbidity, immunization and 





This paper uses four sources of data (a household survey, a census of the poor, and a 
database with administrative records of the program) to construct two samples of participant and 
nonparticipant children of the program FA for the two research strategies. The first approach 
employs matching methods and household survey data collected for the short-term impact 
evaluation of FA. This survey is part of an effort to collect longitudinal data from a stratified 
random sample of eligible families in both treatment municipalities and matched control 
municipalities. The survey is a standard multi-topic household survey that includes questions on 11 
 
demographics, household structure, education, health, consumption, employment, 
anthropometry, housing characteristics, shocks, and community education and health facilities. 




The matching analysis draws only from the baseline survey which interviewed 6,722 
households in 57 treatment municipalities and 4,562 households in 9 control municipalities.
11 
The subsample for this analysis includes only children who were born during 1975-1994, and 
who may have graduated from high school between 2003 and 2009.
12
 
 For instance, a child that 
had completed grade 6 at baseline (either in a treated or control area) was expected to finish high 
school (grade 11) by 2007 if the child progressed on schedule. In contrast, a child starting 
primary school (grade 1) in 2002 (baseline) will not be able to finish high school at least before 
2013. Therefore, the relevant cohorts of children to estimate the average impacts of the program 
are those who at baseline had 4 to 10 years of schooling, and who were 18 years old or younger 
(called “PSM data”). The baseline survey is also used to construct most of the pre-program 
covariates for the matching procedures.  
The samples of analysis for the RDD approach are constructed with two different 
administrative sources of data. The first is the monitoring and evaluation system, SIFA, created 
for administrative and monitoring purposes at the onset of the FA program. The system is a 
longitudinal census of program beneficiaries from 2001 to present. To date, there is information 
on approximately 2.8 million families currently participating in the program. The second source 
of information is the data from a census of the poor (Sisben) carried out between 1994 and 2003 
to construct the poverty index score for the proxy-means test. Questions were asked regarding 
households’ demographics, structure, durable goods, housing characteristics, human capital, 
labor force participation, income, and access to basic services. By 2003, the surveys covered 
                                                           
10 Two follow-up surveys revisited the same households in 2003 and 2005. 
11 Nearly 12 percent of the households interviewed in treatment municipalities were not registered with the program (Attanasio et 
al., 2005).  
12 We merged the household survey data with administrative data from the standardized test score Icfes. Using this merged 
dataset, we identified that 95 percent of the population that presented the test in the 2000-2009 period were born during the 
period1975-1994. In order to study the indirect effects of participant children on non-eligible young adults that were still in 
school or could rejoin, this sample also includes individuals 19 to 23 years old that were listed as dependents, but are not eligible 
to the program.    
 12 
 
over 25 million individuals.
13 Data from SIFA and Sisben were carefully merged using 
confidential information on date of birth, full name, and national identification numbers. The 
resulting dataset (“SIFA + Sisben data”) contains the universe of individuals above and below 
the threshold of eligibility (whether or not they actually participate in the program). This 
information is then used to construct indicators of program participation and length of exposure. 
In order to focus on a period of time that is comparable to the one examined in the matching 
analysis, the final subsample is restricted to treatment municipalities that were covered during 
the first phase of expansion between 2001 and 2004. This implies that in addition to the 
comparison group, the samples are comprised of beneficiaries that could have been covered for 




The two resulting data sets (“PSM data” and “SIFA + Sisben data”) are merged with the 
administrative records on registration and results for the Icfes test.
15 This exam is a nationally 
recognized and standardized test that is administered prior to graduation from high school and 
mandatory for entrance to higher education. Over four million students registered and took the 
test between 2003 and 2009. This database identifies test takes by date of birth, full name and 
national identification number. This dataset is merged with the cohorts of children identified in 
the “PSM data” assembled to perform the matching analysis, and with the “SIFA+SISBEN data” 
to implement the RDD strategy. In order to avoid problems of nonrandom mismatch, strict 
procedures were followed to merge the datasets including matching based on full name, birth 
date, national identification number, and a minimization of the phonetic Levenshtein distance.
16 
(see Appendix A for more details about the data merging procedures). The final matching rates 




The long-term impacts of the program on the human capital of children are estimated on two 
outcome variables. The first is an indicator of high school completion that is measured through a 
dummy variable that identifies whether a child registered or not for the Icfes test during the 
                                                           
13 A new Sisben survey was fielded between 2003 and 2007 to update the information, improve the effectiveness of the targeting 
scheme, and change the algorithm due to concerns regarding manipulation by local authorities (Barrera, Linden, and Urquiola, 
2007; Camacho and Conover, 2011).  
14 The final sample also excludes internally displaced people who became eligible to the program much later. 
  
15 More recently called Saber 11. 
16 The Levenshtein distance measures the difference between two strings, in terms of edits you have to do to convert one string 
into the other.  
17 We considered 10 points above and below the threshold to check the matching for the RDD sample. 13 
 
period 2003-2009. Although the test is given to students just prior to graduation (grade 11), 
registration to the test is a good proxy for high school completion since over 90 percent of the 
test takers end up finishing grade 11 (World Bank, 1993; Angrist et al., 2006).
18
 
 The test is also a 
strong determinant of college entrance as it fulfills the qualifying requirements in several 
subjects. The second outcome of interest measures academic achievement. Conditional on Icfes 
registration, we measured academic learning by the actual performance of the students on the 
test. The exam is a standardized test that assesses the academic achievement of students in 
various subjects such as Mathematics, Language, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, History, 
Geography, and a foreign language chosen by the student. We focus on the impacts of the 
program on the standardized scores in the Mathematics and Language modules (35 questions 
each) and the overall score in the test excluding foreign language. 
4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 Research Design 
 
The FA program was not randomly assigned as eligibility requirements were based on 
geographic and welfare targeting. Only extremely poor households with at least one child 
between 7 and 18 years old and a score in the proxy-means test that falls Sisben 1 level are 
deemed eligible for the education transfer of FA. Additionally, the program was initially 
implemented only in certain qualified municipalities based on their supply of health, education 
and financial services. These eligibility criteria may be problematic for evaluation as they may 
induce different sources of selection bias including observable and unobservable factors that 
could be correlated with program eligibility and educational outcomes. For instance, small towns 
like those initially targeted by the program may have poorer public infrastructure, less dynamic 
economies, and therefore lower returns to schooling. Parents living in these places may be less 
willing to send their children to school. In this case, lower improvements in school attainment 
over time among participant children relative to nonparticipant children in other towns could be 
mistakenly attributed to the program as negative effects. Moreover, given that participation in the 
program is voluntary, those families who sign up for the program in treatment areas may be 
different in many aspects from those who decide not to participate.  We attempt to overcome the 
                                                           
18 A small fraction of individuals also take the ICFES test after they have finished high school. Also, since the test can be taken 
many times, only the first registration date and score is kept for the small number of students who took it more than once.      14 
 
potential identification issues that may arise from non-random assignment and voluntary 





The first research strategy builds on the design of the first short-term impact evaluation of the 
program. This evaluation was based on a non-experimental design that compares eligible 
households from municipalities covered by the program with potentially eligible households 
(also classified as Sisben level 1) from selected comparable areas not targeted by the program.
19 
We follow different cohorts of children in treatment and control municipalities who were 
interviewed as part of the baseline survey carried out in 2002 and that could have finished high 
school during the period 2003-2009. Hence, the location, age and grade of the children at 
baseline determine their treatment status and length of exposure to the program for the treated. 
Given that 2003 is the first year in which the program was broadly implemented in the samples 
for the matching analysis, the pool of treated individuals includes children with program 
exposure that ranges roughly from one to seven years.
20 A limitation of this research strategy is 
the lack of baseline measures of the outcome variables, making it difficult to test for differences 
between groups at the pre-program time. Given that high school graduation and test scores are in 
reality observed only once for the same child, program effects are therefore estimated with post-




Matching methods are used in the comparison of outcomes to adjust for potential biases due 
to nonrandom targeting and selection into the program. The standard underlying assumption for 
                                                           
19  Municipalities were grouped based on the number of eligible families that reside in each of them to form 639 Primary 
Sampling Units (PSU). Twenty-five strata were then defined based on geographic location, level of urbanization, number of 
eligible families, and indexes of quality of life and availability of school and health facilities in the municipality. Fifty PSUs (two 
within each stratum) corresponding to 57 municipalities targeted by the program were selected and then matched to 50 “control” 
PSUs (equivalent to 63 municipalities) that were relatively similar to “treatment” PSUs. Matching was done within each stratum 
and the comparability of both types of PSUs was assessed on the basis of population size and an index of quality of life. Finally, a 
stratified random sample of eligible households was selected in treatment and matched control municipalities. For more details 
about the matching process and the stratified random methods followed in the evaluation, see Attanasio and others (2005).  
20 It would be important to measure how the impacts of the program vary with different years of exposure. However, due to 
empirical limitations, this marginal impact cannot be properly identified. Despite the fact that the presence of cohorts would 
induce variation of treatment dosage, the evaluation design used in this paper cannot disentangle the effects of age on the 
outcomes from those of length of exposure. Conditional on being enrolled in school, older beneficiaries (when they joined the 
program) have fewer years ahead of them in school, and perhaps, are more likely to be observed finishing high school. If this is 
the case, shorter length of exposure may be wrongly attributed to higher school completion rates.   
21 Only a very small fraction of children were found to have taken the test more than once. However, although the test can be 
taken several times, it is administered only to students who have achieved grade 11.    15 
 
this approach is that matching on the propensity score (i.e. the estimated probability of 
participation in the program) eliminates any bias generated by pre-treatment differences between 
the two groups as long as there are no differences in unobservable variables that jointly influence 
program participation and the outcomes under analysis. The availability in the baseline survey of 
relevant pretreatment information to model program targeting and participation, in principle, 
makes the application of the matching methodology suitable for the evaluation of FA.   
 
Although careful procedures were followed in the early evaluation to select comparable 
control areas, a comparison of baseline characteristics between treated and control children in 
our sample using standardized t-tests and normalized differences, presented in Table 1, reveal a 
number of differences that are statistical significant. In order to balance the distribution of 
covariates between the two groups and assess the sensitivity of the results, we matched children 
on the basis of three different model specifications to predict the probability of treatment. Table 
2 presents the group of variables included in the three models used to predict participation into 
the program. The first model (Model 1) includes standard individual and household pre-
treatment socio-economic and demographic characteristics such as age and order of the child, 
dummy variables for married and participating in the labor force head of the household, age, 
education and gender of household head, urban location, the number of children in the household 
ages 7 to 11 and 12 to 18, and monthly expenditures. The second model (Model 2) extends 
Model 1 by adding a number of municipality-level covariates that proxy for measures of 
educational supply and demand at baseline (for instance, pupil/teacher ratio and access to 
schools). In addition, the third model (Model 3) includes all but the health variables used by 
Attanasio et al. (2005) in their participation models estimated for the evaluation of the short-term 
impacts of the FA program. This augmented specification includes additional household- and 
municipality-level variables mostly associated with the attributes of the dwellings, family 
structure, access to basic services, population, relevant public infrastructure, population, and 
geographic characteristics.
22
                                                           
22 See tables 1, 2 and 3 for a complete list of all variables used in each of the models of participation. 
 Various kernel techniques and bandwidths are used to match 
children and define common supports that exclude poor matches between treatment and control 
groups. The estimated propensity scores for each of the three different model specifications 16 
 
suggest that there is a strong overlap between the treatment and comparison groups.  We then 
estimate the treatment effect in a standard way as follows: 
∆𝐴𝑇𝐸 =
1
𝑛∑[𝐸(𝑌 1|𝐷 = 1,𝑋) − 𝐸(𝑌 0|𝐷 = 0,𝑋)]                 (1) 
 
Balancing checks were conducted to assess the comparability of treatment and control 
children after conditioning for observable characteristics that explain participation into the 




we do not find major statistically significant differences in the conditioning variables between 
treated and control within strata having similar probabilities of program participation. Even 
though there is not a formal way to rule out the existence of unobserved factors that could 
determine participation and the final outcomes, these results provide confidence in the ability of 
matching with the estimated propensity scores to indentify program impacts. 
An additional concern for identification remains when program impacts on learning are 
estimated with academic tests given to children enrolled and present in school. By raising school 
enrollment, CCTs –including FA, make program participants more likely to take tests given their 
higher school participation. The “marginal” children that are brought into school and promoted 
through grades due to FA are probably different (for instance, poorer or less motivated) from 
those who would have been enrolled or attended school regardless of the subsidy. There may 
also be heterogeneity in the expected returns to education between those previously enrolled in 
school and the new enrollees. If this type of selection exists, the test score distributions of treated 
and control children tested in school are not comparable. In order to address this issue, we follow 
Lee (2002) and Angrist et al. (2006) to construct nonparametric upper bounds of program effects 
(for the matching analysis) on learning by symmetrically truncating the two distributions at some 
specific quantile. In contrast, unadjusted (selection-contaminated) comparisons of test scores –
conditional on positive scores– provide lower bound estimates of program impacts (see 
Appendix B for details on the methodology for nonparametric bounds of program impacts).  
 
                                                           
23 Additional regression analysis also shows that, after controlling for the estimated probability to participate, no additional 
conditioning variables help predict the receipt of treatment.  17 
 
Regression Discontinuity Design 
 
The second research design employed in this paper exploits variation in assignment to 
treatment arising from the discontinuous rule that determines eligibility to the program. As noted 
before, a proxy-means test designed with the goal of identifying the most vulnerable population 
that qualifies for various social programs was used to define the target population of FA. The 
index (Sisben) varies between 0 and 100 and is the result of an algorithm that weights 
households’ variables associated with their socio-economic wellbeing. Households placed in the 
first bracket of Sisben (level 1), namely those with scores below 18 and 36 in rural and urban 
areas, respectively, were considered eligible for the first phase of the program. In principle, the 
expected discrete change in participation produced by the rule offers an opportunity to estimate 
the causal effects of the program on education outcomes with a Regression Discontinuity Design 
(RDD). The intuition behind this strategy is that households that lie just below and just above the 
threshold are statistically comparable except for their participation in the program. As a result, 
any discontinuity in the conditional distribution of high school graduation rates and tests scores 
at the cutoff could be interpreted as the effect of FA.   
 
We used data from SIFA, an information management system that compiles information on a 
number of operational aspects of the program including historical records of all beneficiaries. 
When merging it with the Sisben scores, these databases allow identification of the universe of 
individuals in households that lie below or above (in a smaller proportion) the cutoff of 
eligibility and participate in the program between one and nine years. Information on the rest of 
the population relevant for the analysis – those eligible but not participating and those with 
Sisben scores above the threshold of eligibility— is obtained from a census of the poor that was 
collected between 1994 and 2003 used to compute the Sisben proxy-means test. Both datasets are 




In practice, the Sisben poverty score predicts substantial but not perfect changes in the 
probability of receiving the treatment. In fact, the data show a significant discontinuity in the 
probability of assignment to treatment at the threshold of around 66 to 72 percentage points as 
                                                           
24 Given that the information system of the program does not  reports SISBEN scores for participant families, uniform  scores for 
the whole sample are calculated by using  the proxy means testing  algorithm  and the information from the Census of the Poor 
1994-2003.  18 
 
presented in Figure 1 and Table 3.
25
 
 Therefore, we perform a fuzzy instead of a sharp RDD. The 
average causal effect of this design is given by the ratio of the jump in the outcome variable at 
the threshold to the jump in the probability of participation in FA also at the threshold. This is 
equivalent to an instrumental variable setting in which the average effect of the treatment is 
obtained from compliers -- individuals whose participation is affected by the cutoff. To check the 
sensitivity of the results to different specifications, estimates of program impacts based on the 
RDD are computed using different parametric functional forms and nonparametric procedures. 
Besides, to restrict the sample close to the cutoff, optimal bandwidths for the nonparametric 
analysis were also estimated using Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2010) methods.  
Our first stage regression formally tests if the probability of treatment 𝐷𝑖𝑚𝑡 for individual i, in 
municipality m, and in year t changes discontinuously at the cutoff point. We estimate different 
polynomial specifications of the model allowing the regression function to differ on both sides of 
the threshold as follows: 
                       𝐷𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝗼0 + 𝗿𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝗼1𝑓(𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡|𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 ≤ 𝑠∗) + 𝗼2𝑓(𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 |𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 > 𝑠∗) + 𝗾𝑚 + 𝜗𝑖𝑚𝑡  (2) 
 
Where 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 1[𝑠𝑖 ≤ 𝑠∗] is an index function that indicates whether the Sisben score of the 
individual i is below the eligibility threshold 𝑠∗,𝗾𝑚correspond to municipality fixed effects 
included in the regression. Results from the first stage of the fuzzy design, summarized in Table 3, 
show that there is a large and significant jump in the treatment probability 𝗿 at the cutoff of the 
assignment variable. In fact, and confirming the graphical analysis presented in Figure 1, all 
point estimates of 𝗿 given by the models vary from 0.69 to 0.73 significant at the 1 percent level, 
regardless of the flexibility specified in the functional form around the threshold..  
 
Our reduced form equation is described by the following equation: 
      𝑌 𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝜏𝑜 + 𝗽𝐷𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜏1𝑓(𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡|𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 ≤ 𝑠∗) + 𝜏2𝑓(𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 |𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 > 𝑠 ∗)+ 𝗾𝑚 + 𝜏3𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑚𝑡          (3) 
 where 𝑌 𝑖𝑚𝑡 corresponds to our outcome of interest (i.e. high school graduation). The fuzzy 
Regression Discontinuity analysis instruments the treatment dummy, 𝐷imt, with 𝑇imt to identify 
                                                           
25 This may happen for at least two reasons. First, take up rates were in the order of 65 percent so participation is not universal 
among the eligible population. Second, households above the threshold may lobby with local authorities to gain access to the 
program. Concerns of nonrandom sorting that could arise from this or other gaming behaviors to influence the Sisben poverty 
index score are discussed in the robustness section.  19 
 
the “intent-to-treat” effect. Our coefficient of interest corresponds to the ratio of the coefficient 
of the treatment effect from the reduced form, 𝗽, and the coefficient of that identifying individual 
eligibility, 𝗿. Results from this approach and the matching analysis are presented next. However, 
before discussing the findings, it is important to mention that the effect estimated with the RDD 
framework is only applicable to the group of individuals around the threshold of eligibility. For 
this reason, although program impacts derived from matching and RDD analyses seek to 
estimate the same parameter, they are not strictly comparable. 
 
4.2 Program Impacts 
 
High School Completion 
 
In theory, the net effect of CCTs on children’s school completion is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, there are two obvious positive direct effects. One is an income effect arising from the cash 
transfer which increases the budget of the family so that they could afford keeping the children in 
school. The second comes from the program’s condition on regular school attendance, which 
introduces a substitution effect for children not in school or not attending regularly as it reduces 
the relative price of education. Together these effects are expected to increase the demand for 
education among the target population, a prediction widely confirmed in the literature in the 
form of positive effects on school enrollment, attendance and progression. If the additional 
investments in educational services are continued over time, one might also expect an increase in 
high school completion. On the other hand, there are other possible mechanisms that could 
reverse these positive effects. For instance, classrooms may be overcrowded by the additional 
enrollment affecting the academic performance and progress of children. Additionally, perverse 
incentives could encourage families to delay children’s graduation just to prolong their 
participation in the program if the child still meets the age criteria for eligibility, i.e. below 18 
years of age. In addition to the standard income and substitution effects, child-specific 
conditional transfers like the ones offered by FA could also have negative impacts on the school 
outcomes of ineligible siblings due to a displacement effect (Ferreira et al., 2009). 
 
Findings from the first empirical approach (matching analysis) on the net effects on high 
school completion are summarized in Table 4. We report 3 sets of regression for each matching 
model. For comparison purposes the first column in each pair corresponds to the OLS 20 
 
specification including a linear form all the variables from the matching model, whereas the 
second column presents the matching model. Overall, OLS results suggests that on average 
treated children are between 3 and5 percentage points more likely to finish high school. Results 
from the three different specifications of the model of participation also show positive and 
statistically significant effects of the program on high school completion. In this case impact 
estimates vary between 4 and 8.4 percentage points depending on the specification of the 
propensity score. Looking at the existing evidence produced for other programs, these effects 
appear to be comparable to those estimated for similar CCT and education fee waiver programs 
in Pakistan and Colombia where, as discussed previously in the background section, participants 




Table 4 also includes impacts based on the gender and location (rural or urban) to test for 
heterogeneous effects of the program. The analysis by gender uncovers clear differences in the 
magnitude of impacts for participant boys and girls. On one hand, results for the sample of girls 
based on OLS and matching estimates always yield positive and statistically significant effects 
on high school graduation rates. The magnitude of the effects ranges from 4.6-6.5 percentage 
points in the OLS framework to 5.2-8.9 percentage points in the matching analysis. For all these 
cases, results are strongly significant in statistical terms at the 1 percent level. On the other hand, 
the pattern in impact estimates for boys is less obvious. While OLS point estimates indicate that 
there are no program effects, two of the three point estimates obtained from matching models 
(Model 2 and Model 3) appear to be just marginally significant at the 10 percent level. Results 
from the sample used in the RD analysis, presented in Table 5, also seem to suggest that program 
effects on high school completion are a little larger among girls.  
 
The distribution of impacts on high school completion varies with the location of program 
beneficiaries as well. However, there is a clear difference between the results from the matching 
and RDD approaches. Evidence from the PSM models suggests that the effects on high school 
graduation rates accrue mostly to participant children whose families resided in rural areas at the 
                                                           
26 A similar CCT program implemented in Bogota (Colombia), Subsidios, increased the probability of completing high school by 
4 percentage points. Beneficiaries of Colombian PACES, which offered vouchers to attend private secondary schools to students 
from poor urban neighborhoods, are also found to be 5-7 percentage points more likely to graduate from high school. In Pakistan, 
the Female School Stipend program, a CCT targeting girls, appears to improve the chance of completing grade 9 in high school 
for girls aged 15-16 years old by 5 percentage points (Angrist and others, 2004; Barrera-Osorio and others, 2008; Alam and 
others, 2010). 21 
 
baseline (most likely girls based on the previous results). Whereas the effects on the samples of 
children in rural areas are positive and strongly significant in both economic and statistical sense 
in all models, analogous point estimates obtained for beneficiaries in urban areas are mostly 
insignificant – except for a marginally significant impact from the second matching model. Even 
if the discussion is limited to the parameter estimates of this particular model, the findings show 
that the size of the effect in urban centers is still half of that for children in rural municipalities - 
about 5 percentage points compared to 10.4 percentage points.  Even though there are no data to 
empirically identify the channels that may explain these differences in terms of location and 
gender, a possible explanation is that the marginal effects of the transfer and the conditionality 
are larger for girls in rural settings for whom the opportunity costs of education are relatively 
lower (for instance, if households are less dependent on the labor of the girls for farming 
activities).  
 
We then turn to program effects on high school completion estimated on a different sample 
and using the RDD approach. To inform the discussion, the results of the RDD analysis are first 
shown in a graphical way. Figure 2 show the average and estimated high school completion rates 




 Means of high school completion rates for each value of the normalized poverty 
index score also provide suggestive evidence that FA had a positive effect on high school 
graduation. The “jump” at the threshold indicates that the discontinuous change in eligibility 
increases the probability of finishing high school. 
In addition to examining the possibility of impacts and understanding the functional form 
through graphical analysis, program effects are estimated econometrically with different 
parametric regressions that include different polynomial functions and non-parametric 
regressions following Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2010). In specifications 1 and 2 of Table 5, we 
include quadratic forms of the control function  𝑓(𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡|𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 ≤ 𝑠∗),𝑓(𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 |𝑠𝑖𝑚𝑡 > 𝑠 ∗), where si 
correspond to the value of the proxy-means test (Sisben) and s* denotes the threshold of 
eligibility, and let the regression function differ on both sides of the cutoff point. In columns 3 to 
                                                           
27  The cut-off of eligibility takes different values for urban and rural municipalities. Therefore, rather than presenting the 
outcomes as a function of the Sisben poverty index score, they are normalized as the distance of each child’s score to the area-
specific cut-off that is used to classify households as level 1 in the proxy-means test system, and determine eligibility for this 
specific program. For instance, a child with a value -5 is in reality 5 points below the cutoff and is therefore eligible to FA. In 
contrast, positive values of the normalized score represent children that belong to ineligible households, given the eligibility rule.  22 
 
6, we also run other flexible specifications of the regression function including cubic and quartic 
functional forms of the control function. Non-parametric estimations of the models are presented 
in column 7.  Throughout all functional form specifications with or without including controls, 
we identify a positive and significant impact on the high school completion of children that 
participate in the program. Overall, focusing on our preferred specifications that are the quartic 
functional form with controls and nonparametric models (columns 6), we estimate that 
beneficiary children are between 3.3 and 4.5 percentage points more likely to finish high school, 
including municipality fixed effects. These results are robust to inclusion of controls for school 
quality (average score in the ICFES test and class size by school and year).  
 
Finally, we looked at the possible indirect effects of FA on the school completion of 
nonparticipating young adults who reside with participant group children. This indirect effect 
could be caused by a substitution of resources and time allocated to work between eligible and 
non-eligible children within the household that, although positive for participant children, is 
expected to run in the opposite direction for ineligible children.
28 The treatment group was 
comprised of ineligible young adults who were more than 18 years old and had not finished high 
school when at least one of the children of the same household joined the program. The high 
school graduation rate of this group is compared with those of young adults of similar 
characteristics who reside either in eligible families in control areas (matching analysis) or in 
families that were ineligible for the program, but that are otherwise similar to participant 
households (RDD).29  Overall, the analysis (results not shown) does not reveal consistent 
evidence of either positive or negative indirect effects of the program on the school completion 






Analogous to the existent ambiguity in the link between CCTs and high school completion, 
the net effect of interventions that increase school participation on learning outcomes is difficult 
                                                           
28 A clear example is the reallocation of labor or child caring away from participant children—so that they are able to comply 
with the conditionality—towards ineligible children in the household. Existing empirical studies have provided evidence of either 
negative effects or no effects of CCTs or similar programs on the school enrollment of ineligible siblings in Cambodia, Colombia 
and Pakistan (Ferreira and others 2009; Barrera-Osorio and others 2008; Alam and others 2009). 
29 The final sample includes young adults that meet the criteria outlined in the text and that were identified in the survey as 
household members but not as the main breadwinner.        
30 Results available from the authors upon request. 23 
 
to establish theoretically. In principle, students who attend school more regularly and spend more 
time doing school work due to FA are supposed to have higher academic achievement than non-
recipient children who are out of school or attend less regularly
31
 
. In fact, cross-country evidence 
shows that school attainment correlates strongly with test scores (Filmer and others, 2006). In 
addition, CCTs like FA could enhance learning at least through two additional channels. First, 
cash and nutritional transfers have been found to encourage positive behaviors towards 
investments in cognitive enhancing inputs such as books, more nutritious food, and parental 
time, and less child work. Second, the conditionality on attendance required by the program 
could lead to more learning for enrolled children who do not attend school regularly. 
Nonetheless, there may be other effects running in the opposite direction. For instance, the extra 
influx of students may increase class size and put additional pressure on existing educational 
resources. In addition to congestion, increased enrollment may also affect class composition and 
trigger negative peer effects in learning. Moreover, CCTs are often targeted to the neediest areas 
where school quality may be low. Finally, with just a few exceptions -not in the Colombian case, 
CCTs have not been designed with explicit objectives and incentives to raise academic 
performance.     
However, as noted above, selection bias can confound the analysis due to different 
observable and unobservable characteristics of the marginal students who would not have joined 
school, progressed until grade 11 and taken the exam in absence of the program. If it exists, this 
sort of selection will most probably introduce low-scorers into the distribution of the treatment 
group. To address the probability of sample selection for children that took the test, we 
performed bounding procedures to symmetrically truncate the distributions of the treatment and 
control group at a quantile φ0 where non-selected control children begin having positive scores 
(i.e. start taking the exam), that is, for each score Y, the following should hold: 𝑌�𝑞𝜑0� > 0 
(Appendix B provides more details on this methodology). This is equivalent to estimating the 
impacts for the students who would have taken the exam in the absence of the program (“always 
takers”). Given that the procedure rests on the assumption that the selection bias is negative, the 
unadjusted conditional-on-positive comparison of test scores provides a lower bound of the 
impact of the program. Table 6 presents Model 1, 2 and 3 in the following way:  the OLS 
                                                           
31 If regular attendance on average is lower than 80 percent of the classes.  24 
 
estimates, the unadjusted nonparametric lower bound estimates, the quantile φ0 where non-
selected control children begin having positive scores, and the corresponding adjusted 
nonparametric upper bounds estimates. Overall, these findings do not provide an indication of 
program effects on test scores either. For the most part, program effects estimated at φ0 are 
insignificant. There are, however, some positive and significant effect of 0.098 and 0.069 of a 
standard deviation on Spanish and the overall test score, respectively. However, these results are 
very unstable and hold only for the specifications of the first model of participation in the 
matching analysis.   
 
In general, findings from the second research design (RDD) on the “SIFA + Sisben” sample, 
in Table 7, also indicate that program recipients who graduate from high school perform at the 
same level as equally poor non-recipient graduates. The graphical analysis
32
 
 does not provide 
visual evidence of a jump in the regression function at the threshold. Overall, econometric results 
based on functional forms with second, third and fourth-order polynomials in general show that 
participant children do as good as the children in the control group in their math test scores. 
There is a partial negative effect of the program on Spanish (significant at the 5 percent level) 
but not consistent throughout all the functional form specifications. Furthermore, the findinga 
indicate that there is no systematic evidence of differential performance between participant and 
non-participant children based on the scores in the overall test. The non-parametric estimations 
(estimated on an optimal bandwidth close to the cutoff following Imbens and Kalyanaraman 
(2010)) consistently show that test scores are lower for treated children. Nevertheless we should 
take into that account that we were not able to correct for the negative selection bias, given that 
the controls appear to be over-represented in this data. Additionally, results coming from the 
non-parametric estimation use a local sample very close to the threshold assigned by the optimal 
bandwidth. When compared against the little evidence available, the absence of impacts of FA 
on learning outcomes reported in this paper mirrors the findings available from previous 
evaluations of comparable interventions in Mexico and Cambodia (Behrman and others, 2005; 
Filmer and Schady, 2009). 
                                                           
32 Not presented, but available upon request to the Authors. 25 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
 
This section discusses the robustness of the findings regarding a number of identification 
issues that may affect the internal validity of the analysis. We start by discussing in more detail 
the quality of the treatment and control groups in terms of their comparability. In the case of 
matching, the underlying assumption states that there are no unobservables that could create 
nonrandom selection into the program after matching treated and control children on the 
estimated probability of assignment to treatment. Although there is no definitive test to formally 
rule out selection on unobservables, a series of checks on observable variables do not provide a 
serious indication of this type of bias in our matching analysis. We performed balancing checks 
to assess the comparability of treatment and control children after conditioning for a large set of 
observable pre-program characteristics at the individual, household, and community levels that 
explain participation into the program. Regression analysis shows that, after controlling for the 
probability of participation, no additional conditioning variables help predict the receipt of 
treatment. Furthermore, there are no major statistically significant differences in the conditioning 
variables between the treatment and control within the same strata of similar probabilities of 
program participation. These balancing tests are particularly robust for the first specification of 
the model of participation (Model 1). In addition to the common support restriction, we also 
dropped observations with probability of participation below 0.1 or above 0.9.   
 
As for the RDD approach, the analogous condition for identification is that the groups of 
people right below and above the threshold of eligibility need to be statistically equivalent and 
that the only difference between them is the treatment itself. To account for possible differences 
in addition to participation in the program, we run RDD models based on specifications 
including municipality fixed effects. Overall, the main findings of the paper regarding the 
impacts on high school completion appear to be stable across these different model 
specifications, signaling robustness to a variety of covariates. Unfortunately, it was not possible 
to control directly for school fixed effects in the econometric analysis.
 33
                                                           
33 It was not possible to control for school fixed effects in the econometric analysis for at least three reasons. First, high school 
completion is observed only for individuals in the relevant ages that registered for the ICFES test and therefore it is impossible to 
know the school of children that were not matched to the ICFES database. Second, information with the name and code of 
schools exists only for a – probably not random- subsample of the students who took the ICFES test. Third, in many cases – 
particularly in small municipalities where the school supply is fixed – the inclusion of municipality fixed effects is expected to 
remove any existing school fixed effects.  
 This, however, seems to 26 
 
be less problematic in the RDD since treatment and control groups are in some cases comprised 
of children that attend the same schools, particularly in small municipalities. Additionally, for the 
RDD analysis, we constructed a more balanced (trimmed) sample using the distribution of the p-
score and dropping units with a propensity score below 0.1 or above 0.9 to make estimates more 
precise and less sensitive to changes in specification (Crump et al. 2009).  
 
To test the identifying assumption of the RDD approach formally, we carried out a number of 
continuity checks on baseline characteristics at the individual and household level –all of them 
available from the census of the poor and used for the Sisben proxy-means test – that could be 
associated with the outcomes of interest. Figure 3 and Table 9 show graphical and regression 
analysis on the relationship between the Sisben poverty index score and these variables. Because 
of the large size of the sample used in the analysis, these differences are very precisely estimated. 
In general, there are not remarkable statistically significant differences in pre-program 
characteristics between the two groups on each side of the cutoff that could be argued to drive 
the results. In cases where the differences are statistically significant, the magnitude of the 
discontinuity is either relatively small in economic sense to drive the results (on average 0.046 
more children in households right above the threshold of eligibility) or the direction of the 
difference (smaller household size or larger home ownership) is unlikely to introduce a bias that 
could affect the interpretation of our results.   
 
Another potential concern in the RDD is the possibility that individuals could manipulate the 
assignment variable (the Sisben poverty index score) and generate nonrandom sorting around the 
threshold. For example, the RDD approach may be invalid if more motivated and education-
driven people seek to influence the value of their scores by taking actions such as hiding assets, 
‘borrowing’ children from other families to increase the size of the household, or bribing local 
authorities and program administrators. This may undermine the comparability of people on each 
side of the cutoff. While it is impossible to fully rule out this type of behavior in the context of 
FA, there are several reasons to believe that direct manipulation of the assignment mechanism is 
not a major concern for identification. First, an examination of the density of the Sisben score, 
presented in Figure 4, itself shows that there are no jumps in the distribution at the eligibility 27 
 
threshold of this program
34
 
 for the whole sample or when broken down by gender and location. 
Second, and related to the continuity checks discussed above, there is no evidence of discrete 
changes in the distribution of other observable dimensions beyond the probability of 
participation in the program that could indicate some degree of manipulation of the scoring and 
ranking system. 
Another issue is the possibility of nonrandom migration and crossover. In theory, families in 
control areas could try to migrate to treatment areas to become eligible for the program. This 
may affect the internal validity of the analysis if, for instance, families that are poor – and 
perhaps systematically different from non-migrants in other dimensions – are more likely to 
engage in this type of migration. Similarly, parents that live in control areas may prefer to send 
their children to schools that serve program beneficiaries if they are perceived to be of higher 
quality and are within their geographical reach. There are, however, a number of reasons to think 
that migration and crossover effects of this sort are unlikely to invalidate the findings of this 
paper. First, migration from control to treatment municipalities is close to zero among the 
baseline households examined in the PSM approach and that were resurveyed in the two 
subsequent rounds of longitudinal data collected in 2003 and 2005. Second, as noted above, part 
of the control group used for the RD analysis is comprised of children and adolescents that are 
above the cutoff of eligibility but reside in the same municipalities than participating children. 
Third, the economic incentives induced by the amount of the transfer (around $7-14 per eligible 
child) are probably not enough to compensate for the direct and indirect costs of migration. 
Fourth, Acción Social, the national agency that administers the program opens calls for 
inscription and enrollment into the FA program only on specific dates for each municipality, 
making it impossible for people to join the program at other times.  
 
Problems of misspecification of the underlying regression models may introduce bias in 
treatment effects, particularly in the RD design. In order to avoid such problems, we checked the 
sensitivity of program impacts using various alternative specifications. Overall, the existence or 
lack of program effects on school completion and test scores, respectively, from the first 
approach is fairly stable across parametric (OLS) and nonparametric (matching) models. 
                                                           
34 Camacho and Conover (2011) find evidence of manipulation for the Sisben proxy-means test constructed with the same census 
of the poor. However, this problem occurs only for people around the level 2 threshold which determines eligibility for other 
social programs such the Subsidized Health Insurance (Régimen Subsidiado). 28 
 
Similarly, and given that the consequences of model misspecification are more serious in the 
RDD approach, the empirical models in this design were run for a number of low-order 
polynomial functions as well as other more flexible functional forms including third- and fourth-
order polynomials and non-parametric models. The direction – and even in some cases the 
magnitude – of the RDD estimates to test for school completion are robust to the inclusion of 
different polynomial terms in the control function.  
 
Finally, another concern is that the higher rates of matching survey data and test records 
observed for the treatment group may be driven by differences in the merging procedures and 
quality of information rather than by the effect of the program. In particular, considering that part 
of the information used to construct the treatment and control groups come from different 
datasets, it could be that the individual-level variables used to merge them (name, date of birth 
and national identification number) may be more accurate for people in the treatment group. For 
instance, surveyors that collected the data for the short-term impact evaluation could have been 
more careful to correctly keep the information to identify individuals in the treatment group for 
the subsequent rounds of data collection. Similarly, as part of the regular updates of the data 
entered in the information systems of FA (SIFA), program administrators may be more likely to 
correct mistakes in names, birth dates, and national identification numbers of program 
beneficiaries. As a result, individuals in the treatment group may be more likely to be matched 
with records in the Icfes database, not because they are more likely to take the test, but because 
of better information quality. In practice, however, measures computed from the matching 
algorithms such as the Levenshtein distance do not indicate systematic differences in the 
accuracy of data between the treatment and control groups. Therefore, it seems unlikely that this 
could be a reason to find children covered by the FA program to be more likely to be matched to 




Despite growing efforts directed to assessing the impacts of CCTs, the most popular type of 
safety net applied in developing countries, on education, gaps in knowledge exist as to whether 
the largely documented positive effects on enrollment and attendance are sustained over time and 
result in higher school attainment. The evidence on the relationship between higher utilization of 29 
 
school inputs due to CCTs and learning outcomes is equally scant. This paper seeks to help fill 
these gaps by empirically investigating the schooling trajectories and academic performance of 
various cohorts of participant children who have different levels of program exposure ranging 
from one to nine years. We find robust evidence that the FA program increases school attainment 
by helping participant children to finish high school. Indeed, treated children are on average 
between 4 and 8 percentage points – equivalent to an increase of 8-16 percent – more likely to 
graduate from high school relative to those in the control group. If at present the program 
supports nearly 3.5 million poor children and only about 36 percent of the children in Colombia 
who start primary school are expected to graduate from high school
35, a conservative 
extrapolation of program impacts to this population would be equivalent to around 100,000-
200,000 additional high school graduates.
36
 
. Moreover, the size of these program impacts is in 
the same range of magnitude as the effects found in similar CCT and education fee waiver 
programs in Colombia and Pakistan.  
By encouraging participant children to finish high school, the FA program is expected to 
have other positive effects on further human capital gains (increasing the probability of entering 
into higher education), future employability, and income growth. As is the case in most 
developing countries, finishing high school is a critical achievement for low-income individuals 
and may lead to significant positive externalities  in various dimensions. The first obvious 
channel is eligibility to apply for college or formal technical training, which may increase their 
qualifications and economic prospects.
37
                                                           
35 Reference about work from Sanchez 
 Likewise, having a high school diploma already has a 
fairly high value in the labor market in the form of improved access to more and better jobs and 
higher wages. Moving to other plausible dynamic effects, empirical findings in the Colombian 
context suggest that more educated individuals tend to not only have fewer children but also 
36 If households classified in SISBEN 1 have on average 1.37 children between 7 and 18 years and the number of families 
covered by the program is about 2.8 million, FA supports nearly 3.8 million children. The effect of the program in terms of the 
number of students is proxied by the increment in the high school completion rates induced by the program (from 36 percent to 
40-44 percent) with respect to the 3.8 million that are currently participating in FA. Estimates based on the high school 
completion rates observed for the control group from the PSM analysis (children between grades 4 and 10 at baseline) suggests 
that approximately 50 percent of these children would graduate from high school. Applying the effects of the program to this 
completion rate implies that the aggregate effect would be in the order of 140,000-280,000 additional high school graduates. 
37 Indeed, recent evidence for Colombia shows that higher education (college and technical training) provides positive returns on 
wages that range from 7.4 to 12.8 percent (García-Suaza et al., 2009). 30 
 
invest more in their human capital, consistent with the prediction of theories about the trade-offs 




The impact analysis on learning outcomes shows mostly no statistical differences in test 
scores between the treatment and equally disadvantaged control group children. Furthermore, 
there is no clear pattern in the direction, size, and significance of impact estimates across 
different model specifications after adjusting for the probability of sample selection that restricts 
the treated sample to children that would have finished school even without the program. The 
fact that children covered by FA do not perform better than non participant children despite the 
monetary transfer and the conditionality is in line with existing evidence on similar programs in 
Mexico and Cambodia. CCT programs could have various conflicting effects on the learning 
outcomes of participant children. On one hand, beneficiary children may be expected to perform 
better as they stay more in school and their parents invest more time and money in their nutrition, 
health and education. On the other hand, these interventions are often targeted to disadvantaged 
areas where the quality and supply of education are probably low. Besides, the increase in the 
demand for schooling could also cause classroom congestion and induce negative peer effects.  
 
Although interventions like CCTs are designed to improve school participation of poor 
children, not to directly raise learning, there is growing concern regarding the level of skills and 
quality of education with which program participants seek admission to higher education or enter 
the labor force after exiting the program. Therefore, assessing the potential of CCTs and/or 
supplementary interventions for increasing learning is critical for policy making. Innovations in 
project design (for instance, changing the timing of transfers or tying them to performance rather 
than attendance) as well as supplementary supply-side interventions aimed at improving school 
quality and increasing resources for low-performing students are possible options. Pilot tests, 
together with careful evaluations, would surely yield valuable knowledge about the efficacy of 
these policies in linking the objectives of increasing human capital with improving learning 
outcomes.   
   
                                                           
38 Conditional correlations show, for instance, that having a secondary education degree reduces the expected number of children 
by 27 percent, almost twice the effect calculated for primary education; in addition, children’s enrollment status and educational 





Acción Social. 2010a. Familias en Acción: Corbetura Geografica. Accion Social: 
http://www.accionsocial.gov.co/contenido/contenido.aspx?catID=204&conID=157&pagID=275 
 
Acción Social. 2010b. Familias en Acción: Subsidios. Accion Social:  http://www.accionsocial.gov.co 
/contenido /contenido.aspx?catID=204&conID=157&pagID=282 
 
Alam, A., J. Baez, and X. del Carpio. 2011. “Does Cash for School Influence Young Women's Behavior 
in the Longer Term? Evidence from Pakistan.” IZA Discussion Papers N. 5703, Bonn, Germany. 
 
Angrist, Joshua, Eric Bettinger, Erik Bloom, Elizabeth King and Michael Kremer. 2002. “Vouchers for 
Private Schooling in Colombia: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment” American 
Economic Review 92(5): 1535-58. 
 
Angrist, Joshua, Eric Bettinger, and Michael Kremer. 2006. “Long-Term Educational Consequences of 
Secondary School Vouchers: Evidence from Administrative Records in Colombia.” American 
Economic Review 96(3): 847-72. 
 
Angrist, J., E., Bettinger, and M. Kremer. 2004. "Long-Term Consequences of Secondary School 
Vouchers: Evidence from Administrative Records in Colombia," NBER Working Papers 10713.  
 
Attanasio, O., E. Battistin, and A. Mesnard. 2009. “Food and Cash Transfers: Evidence from Colombia.” 
Discussion Paper No. 7326. London, UK: Center for Economic Policy Research. 
 
Attanasio, O., E. Fitzsimmons, A. Gómez, D. López, C. Meghir, and A. Mesnard. 2006. “Child Education 
and Work Choices in the Presence of a Conditional Cash Transfer Programme in Rural Colombia.” 
Working Paper W06/01. London, UK: IFS. 
 
Attanasio, O., E. Fitzsimmons, and A. Gómez. 2005. “The Impact of a Conditional Education Subsidy on 
School Enrollment in Colombia.” Report Summary: Familias 01.  London, UK: IFS. 
 
Attanasio, O. and A. Mesnard. 2005. “The Impact of a Conditional Cash Transfer Programme on 
Consumption in Colombia.” Report Summary: Familias 02.  London, UK: Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
 
Attanasio, O., L. C. Gómez, P. Heredia, and M. Vera-Hernández. 2005. “The Short-Term Impact of a 
Conditional Cash Subsidy on Child Health and Nutrition in Colombia.” Report Summary: Familias 03. 
London, UK: Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
 
Barrera-Osorio, F., M. L. Bertrand, L. Linden, and F. Perez-Calle. 2008. “Conditional Cash Transfers in 
Education: Design Features, Peer and Sibling Effects Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in 
Colombia.” Policy Research Working Paper 4580. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
Barrera-Osario, F., L. L. Linden, and M. Urquiola.  2007. “The Effects of User Fee Reductions on 
Enrollment: Evidence form a Quasi-Experiment,” Columbia  University,  Department of Economics, 
Mimeo. 
 
Camacho, A. and E. Conover. 2011. "Manipulation of a Targeting System". American Economic Journal: 
Economic Policy (forthcoming). 
 32 
 
Crump, R., V. J. Hotz, G. Imbens and O. Mitnik,  “Dealing with Limited Overlap in Estimation of 
Average Treatment Effects”, Biometrika, Vol. 96, Number 1, 187-199, March 2009 
 
Behrman, Jere R., S. W. Parker, and P. E. Todd.  2005. “Long-Term Impacts of the Oportunidades 
Conditional Cash Transfer Program on Rural Youth in Mexico.” Discussion Paper 122. Göttingen, 
Germany: Ibero-America Institute for Economic Research. 
 
Behrman, J. R., P. Sengupta, and P. Todd. 2000. “The Impact of PROGRESA on Achievement Test 
Scores in the First Year.” Final Report. Washington, DC: IFPRI. 
 
Behrman, Jere R., P. Sengupta, and P. E. Todd. 2005. “Progressing through PROGRESA: An Impact 
Assessment of a School Subsidy Experiment in Rural Mexico.” Economic Development and Cultural 
Change 54 (1): 237–75. 
 
Bhargava, A. 2007. The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on the Educational Performance of 
Children: Evidence from Colombia’s Familias en Acción Program.University of British Colombia. 
 
Dubois, P. and M. Rubio-Codina. 2009. “Child Care Provision: Semiparametric Evidence from a 
Randomized Experiment in Mexico.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7203.  
 
Fan, Jiangqing and Irene Gijbels. 1996. Local Polynomial Modelling and Its Applications. New York: 
Chapman and Hall. 
 
Ferreira, F. H. G., D. Filmer, and S. Norbert. 2009. "Own and Sibling Effects of Conditional Cash 
Transfer Programs: Theory and Evidence from Cambodia," Policy Research Working Paper Series 5001. 
Washington, DC: World Bank. 
 
Filmer, D. and N. Schady.  2009. "School Enrollment, Selection and Test Scores."  Policy Research 
Working Paper Series 4998. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
Filmer, D., L. Pritchett, and A. Hasan. 2006. “A Millennium Learning Goal: Measuring Real Progress in 
Education.” Working Paper No. 97. Center for Global Development.  
 
Fiszbein, Ariel, and Norbert Schady. 2009. Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future 
Poverty. Washington, D.C., The World Bank. 
 
Fernando Gamboa, L. and N. Forero Ramírez. 2008. "Fertility and Schooling: How this Relation Changed 
between 1995 and 2005 in Colombia." Working Paper 004711, Universidad del Rosario – Department of 
Economics.  
 
García, S. and J. Hill. 2009. “The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on Children’s School 
Achievement: Evidence from Colombia.” Universidad de los Andes, CEDE Working Paper Series. 
Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1485841 
 
García-Suaza, A.F.; J.C. Guataquí; J.A. Guerra; and D. Maldonado. 2009. “Beyond the Mincer Equation: 
The Internal Rate of Return to Higher Education in Colombia.” Working Paper Series No. 68. Department 
of Economics, University del Rosario. 
 
Glewwe, P. and P. Olinto. 2004. “Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on Schooling: An 
Experimental Analysis of Honduras.” Mimeo. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota. 
 33 
 
Heinrich, C. J. 2007. "Demand and Supply-Side Determinants of Conditional Cash Transfer Program 
Effectiveness." World Development, Elsevier, 35(1): 121-43. 
 
Imbens, Guido W., and Karthik Kalyanaraman. 2010. “Optimal Bandwidth Choice for the Regression 
Discontinuity Estimator.” CeMMAP working papers CWP05/10, Centre for Microdata Methods and 
Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies. 
 
Imbens, Guido W., and Thomas Lemieux. 2008. “Regression Discontinuity: A Guide to Practice.” 
Journal of Econometrics 142(2): 615-35. 
 
Imbens, Guido W., and Jeffrey M. Wooldridge. 2009. “Recent Developments in the Econometrics of 
Program Evaluation.” Journal of Economic Literature 47(1): 5-86. 
 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, Econometría, and Sistemas Especializados de Información. 2006. “Evaluación 
del Impacto del Programa Familias en Acción–Subsidios Condicionados de la Red de Apoyo Social.” 
Bogotá, Colombia: National Planning Department. 
 
Lee, David S., and Thomas Lemieux. 2009. “Regression Discontinuity Designs in Economics.” NBER 
Working Paper 14723, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Prada, C.F. 2006. “Is the Decision of Study in Colombia Profitable?” Essays on Political Economy No. 
51. Prepared for Degree in Economics, Javeriana University. 
 
Rawlings, L. 2002. “Response to a Crisis and Beyond.” In Spectrum 23878: Protecting People with Social 
Safety Nets. Washington, DC: The World Bank.  
 
Sánchez Torres, F.; Núñez Méndez, J. 2003 “A Dynamic Analysis of Human Capital, Female Work-force 
Participation, Returns to Education and Changes in Household Structure in Urban Colombia, 1976-1998.” 
Colombian Economic Journal, 1(1): 109-49. 
 
World Bank. 2010. “Evidence and Lessons Learned from Impact Evaluations in Social Safety Nets.” 
Manuscript. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
World Bank. 2008. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of $636.5 million to 
the Republic of Colombia for a Support for the Second Phase of the Expansion of the Program of 
Conditional Cash Transfers-Familias en Acción Project. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
World Bank. 2005. Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Loan in the Amount of $86.4 million to 
the Republic of Colombia for a Social Safety Net Project. Washington, DC: The World Bank.   34 
 
 
Table 1. Summary Statistics, t-tests and Normalized Differences by Treatment Status 
(Sample for the Matching Analysis) 
 
 
Notes: Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent confidence. Summary statistics calculated for households with at least one child (enrolled or not in school) 
who were 18 or below when she joined the program and that, based on their school attainment at the pre-program time, could have achieved grade 11 between 









   
Mean N Mean N
Demographic
Age (household head) 45.330 2,415 44.940 1,766 0.390 1.076   0.034
Age (spouse) 41.388 2,415 41.002 1,766 0.386 1.115   0.035
Age (child) 12.359 2,420 12.481 1,766 -0.123 -1.746 * -0.055
Gender (household head) 0.772 2,420 0.840 1,766 -0.068 -5.576 *** -0.173
Gender (child) 0.436 2,420 0.428 1,766 0.008 0.517   0.016
Household structure
Is household single headed? 0.021 2,420 0.020 1,766 0.002 0.376   0.012
Number of household members 6.072 2,420 6.165 1,766 -0.093 -1.327   -0.042
Number of children 1.337 2,420 1.419 1,766 -0.082 -2.484 ** -0.078
Consumption and assets
Monthly household consumption 200,000 2,362 212,000 1,697 -12,600 -3.80 *** -0.12
Does the family own the house? 0.667 2,420 0.649 1,766 0.018 1.184   0.037
Education, health and work
Does household head read? 0.826 2,276 0.831 1,673 -0.004 -0.362   -0.012
Household head completed secondary or more? 0.057 2,267 0.078 1,673 -0.02 -2.493 ** -0.081
Years of schooling (household head) 3.715 2,129 4.037 1,576 -0.322 -2.969 *** -0.099
Did children suffer from diarrhea? 0.112 1,086 0.112 702 0 0.013   0.001
Does household head work? 0.887 2,316 0.885 1,720 0.002 0.182   0.006
Dwelling characteristics
Located in an urban area? 0.562 2,420 0.695 1,766 -0.133 -8.943 *** -0.278
No walls? 0.007 2,414 0.011 1,765 -0.004 -1.41   -0.045
Connected to piped water? 0.685 2,409 0.762 1,766 -0.078 -5.599 *** -0.174
Connected to gas? 0.12 2,390 0.14 1,759 -0.021 -1.955 * -0.062
Connected to sewage? 0.334 2,417 0.324 1,766 0.01 0.708   0.022
Community
Altitude 658.161 2,415 567.069 1,766 91.092 3.846 *** 0.121
Students per teacher 22.485 2,415 22.678 1,766 -0.192 -1.139   -0.036
Square metres of classroom per student 2.949 2,415 2.502 1,766 0.448 6.969 *** 0.215
Number of banks 1.694 2,369 0.909 1,766 0.784 14.215 *** 0.446
Number of health centers 1.134 2,369 0.844 1,766 0.29 6.875 *** 0.215
Region = East? 0.214 2,415 0.245 1,766 -0.03 -2.281 ** -0.072
Region = Central? 0.289 2,415 0.162 1,766 0.127 9.953 *** 0.307
Region = Pacific? 0.114 2,415 0.127 1,766 -0.013 -1.227   -0.039
Affected by violent attacks? 0.025 2,415 0.031 1,766 -0.006 -1.107   -0.035
ND Variable
Treated Control




Table 2. Variables included in Models 1, 2 and 3 as determinants of participation in FA program 
 
Notes: 
a Measured in square meters per student in the municipality.  
 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Age  X X
Order of the child X X
Household head is married X X X
Household head works  X X
Male household head X X
Age household head X X X
Urban X X
Household head  years of schooling X X
Number of children ages 7 to 11 X X
Number of children ages 12 to 17 X X
Monthly expenditures  X X
Teacher-pupil ratio in municipality X
Classroom space
a X
Resides in most dense part of municipality  X
Resides in least dense part of municipality  X
Number of urban schools registered in the municipality X
Number of rural Schools registered in the municipality X
Live in a rural disperse area X
Live in a rural populated area X
Age spouse of household head
Education of household head: incomplete  primary  X
Education of household head: complete  primary  X
Education of household head: incomplete  secondary  X
Education of household head: complete  secondary  X
Education spouse: incomplete  primary  X
Education spouse: complete  primary  X
Education spouse: incomplete  secondary  X
Education spouse: complete  secondary  X
Family lives in a house or room X
Wall materials: Tapia, Abobe or Bahareque X
Wall materials: wood X
Wall materials: bad quality wood X
Wall materials: cardboard or no Walls X
House has is connected to natural gas   X












Table 3. Probability of Participation in FA Program 
(First Stage Estimates – ‘Fuzzy’ RDD) 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in square bracket. Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent 
confidence. The units of observation are children (enrolled or not in school) who were  18 years old or younger when 
they joined the program and that, based on their school attainment at the preprogram time, could have achieved grade 11 
between 2003 and 2009 and the number of years needed to complete high school was lower than the number of years of 
treatment. Models include quadratic [(Si - S*)
2], cubic [(Si - S*)
3], and quartic [(Si - S*)
4] specifications of the control 
function below and above the cutoff of eligibility S*. Optimal bandwidths for non-parametric models were computed 
following a cross-validation method suggested by Imbens and Kalyamaran (2010) 
 
   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Eligibility 0.732*** 0.726*** 0.731*** 0.726*** 0.705*** 0.714***
[0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.002]
Observations 624,028 624,028 624,028 624,028 624,028 624,028
R2 0.688 0.741 0.688 0.741 0.689 0.742
Eligibility 0.702*** 0.711*** 0.706*** 0.708*** 0.696*** 0.702*** 0.703***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.008]
Observations 624,028 624,028 624,028 624,028 624,028 624,028 14,647




Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Imbens Optimal Bandwidth 0.7573
Panel A: Same functional form above and below threshold












Table 4 - OLS and Matching Estimates of the Impacts of FA Program on High School Completion 
 
Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent confidence. Bootstrapped standard errors reported in square brackets are 
obtained from 200 replications.The units of observation are children (enrolled or not in school at baseline) who were 18 or 
below at baseline (2002) and that, based on their school attainment at the preprogram time, could have achieved grade 11 
between 2003 and 2009 and the number of years needed to complete high school was lower than the number of years of 
treatment. The mean high school completion rate of the control group for the period 2003-2009 is 0.501. Units of analysis 
are matched on the propensity score from three different specifications of a logistic regression on participation in the 







   
OLS Matching OLS Matching OLS Matching
All sample 0.030* 0.0401** 0.050***  0.0840** 0.049*** 0.0696 **
[0.017] [0.0187] [0.018] [0.0220] [0.017] [0.0214]
Observations 3,452 3,476 3,452 3,476 3,861 3,888
Boys 0.011 0.0206 0.036      0.0661* 0.041      0.0587*
[0.026] [0.0301] [0.027] [0.0363] [0.026] [0.0348]
Observations 1,478 1,490 1,478 1,490 1,676 1,687
Girls 0.046**      0.0523** 0.065***      0.0856*** 0.062***      0.0899***
[0.022] [0.0245] [0.023] [0.0290] [0.023] [0.0290]
Observations 1,974 1,986 1,974 1,986 2,185 2,198
Urban -0.008 -0.0052 0.015      0.0492* 0.019 0.0391
[0.021] [0.0229] [0.022] [0.0274] [0.022] [0.0254]
Observations 2,102 2,120 2,102 2,120 2,352 2,372
Rural 0.091***      0.0868*** 0.115***      0.1044*** 0.108***      0.1176***
[0.028] [0.0314] [0.029] [0.0402] [0.029] [0.0398]
Observations 1,350 1,356 1,350 1,356 1,509 1,514
(1) (2) (3)







Table 5. RDD- 2SLS Estimates of the Impacts of FA on High School Completion 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in square bracket. Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) 
percent confidence. The units of observation are children (enrolled or not in school) who were  18 or below when they 
joined the program and that, based on their school attainment at the pre-program time, could have achieved grade 11 
between 2002 and 2009 and the number of years needed to complete high school was lower than the number of years 
of treatment. Models include quadratic [(Si - S*)2], cubic [(Si - S*)3], and quartic [(Si - S*)4] specifications of the 
control function below and above the cutoff of eligibility S*. Optimal bandwidths for non-parametric models were 







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
All sample 0.011*** 0.018*** 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.052*** 0.039*** 0.024**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.011]
Observations 624,028 624,028 624,028 624,028 624,028 624,028 25,249
Imbens Optimal Bandwidth 1.3101
Boys 0.016*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.045*** 0.033*** 0.023
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.006] [0.015]
Observations 308,345 308,345 308,345 308,345 308,345 308,345 11,374
Imbens Optimal Bandwidth 1.204
Girls 0.007 0.014*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.059*** 0.045*** 0.018
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.017]
Observations 315,544 315,544 315,544 315,544 315,544 315,544 11,191
Imbens Optimal Bandwidth 1.143
Urban 0.000 -0.000 0.018** 0.022*** 0.060*** 0.044*** 0.042**
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.009] [0.019]
Observations 257,689 257,689 257,689 257,689 257,689 257,689 10,202
Imbens Optimal Bandwidth 1.414
Rural 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.051*** 0.038*** 0.021*
[0.004] [0.004] [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.013]
Observations 359,952 359,952 359,952 359,952 359,952 359,952 16,078




Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes










Table 6. OLS and lower and upper bound Matching Estimates of Program Impacts on Mathematics, Spanish, and Overall Test Scores  
 
 
Notes: Test scores are normalized by the mean and the standard deviation in each subject by semester. The definition of the overall test score excludes results of the foreign language test chosen by the 
student. Bootstrapped standard errors reported in square brackets are obtained from 200 replications. Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent confidence. The units of observation are children 
(enrolled or not in school) who were 18 or below at baseline (2002) and that based on their school attainment at the preprogram time could have achieved grade 11 between 2003 and 2009, the number 
of years needed to complete high school was lower than the number of years of treatment, and registered for the ICFES test. Units of analysis are matched on the propensity score from three different 
specifications of a logistic regression on participation in the program. Preprogram covariates of each specification of the logit models of participation are listed in Table 2.  
 
 






















Mathematics -0.401 -0.0189 48 0.033  -0.593 -0.0141 50 0.0374  -0.265 -0.0439 60 0.0179 
[0.392] [0.0474] [0.0419] [0.413] [0.0545] [0.0495] [0.410] [0.0558] [0.0464]
Observations 1,867 1,867 1,850 1,867 1,867 1,850 2,047 2,044 2,023
Spanish 0.398 0.0502 48 0.0982** 0.079 -0.0113 50 0.0421  0.246 0.0171 60 0.0689 
[0.350] [0.0465] [0.0438] [0.368] [0.0902] [0.0525] [0.370] [0.0579] [0.0567]
Observations 1,867 1,867 1,847 1,867 1,867 1,847 2,047 2,044 2,021
Overall test score 0.179 0.0292 48 0.0698** -0.086 0.0040 60 0.0413  0.184 0.0171 60 0.0498 
[0.226] [0.0327] [0.0328] [0.237] [0.0340] [0.0419] [0.239] [0.0361] [0.0358]
Observations 1,867 1,867 1,850 1,867 1,867 1,850 2,047 2,044 2,022
Outcome: Test 
Score












Table 7. RDD - 2SLS Estimates of the Impacts of FA Program on Test Scores. 
 
Notes: Test scores are normalized by the mean and the standard deviation in each subject by year. The definition of the overall test score 
excludes results of the foreign language test chosen by the student. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard reported in square bracket. 
Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent confidence. The units of observation are children (enrolled or not in school) who were 18 or 
below when they joined the program and that, based on their school attainment at the pre-program time, could have achieved grade 11 
between 2003 and 2009, and the number of years needed to complete high school was lower than the number of years of treatment. Models 
include linear [(Si - S*)], quadratic [(Si - S*)
2], cubic [(Si - S*)
3], and quartic [(Si - S*)
4] specifications of the control function below and 
above the cutoff of eligibility S*. Optimal bandwidths for non-parametric models were computed following a cross-validation method 
suggested by Imbens and Kalyamaran (2010) 
 
   
Outcome: Test scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mathematics -0.024 -0.022 -0.034 -0.034 -0.002 -0.015 -0.048***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.023] [0.022] [0.027] [0.027] [0.015]
Observations 131,744 131,744 131,744 131,744 131,744 131,744 11,689
Imbens Optimal Bandwidth 0.60
Spanish -0.044** -0.039** -0.037 -0.037 -0.039 -0.048* -0.100***
[0.018] [0.018] [0.023] [0.023] [0.028] [0.027] [0.010]
Observations 131,744 131,744 131,744 131,744 131,744 131,744 24,724
Imbens Optimal Bandwidth 1.283
Overall test score -0.020 -0.020 -0.025 -0.028* -0.009 -0.025 -0.057***
[0.013] [0.013] [0.016] [0.016] [0.020] [0.019] [0.009]
Observations 131,744 131,744 131,744 131,744 131,744 131,744 17,031




School fixed effects Yes Yes Yes41 
 
Table 8. RDD- 2SLS Estimates of the Impacts of FA on Mathematics, Spanish, and Overall Test Scores  
(by gender and area) 
 
Notes: Scores are normalized by the mean and the standard deviation in each subject by year. The definition of the overall test 
score excludes results of the foreign language test chosen by the student. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard reported in square 
bracket. Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent confidence. The units of observation are children (enrolled or not in 
school) who were 18 or below at baseline (2002) and that based on their school attainment at the preprogram time could have 
achieved grade 11 between 2003 and 2009, the number of years needed to complete high school was lower than the number of 
years of treatment and registered for the ICFES test. Models include linear [(Si - S*)], quadratic [(Si - S*)
2], cubic [(Si - S*)
3], 
and quartic [(Si - S*)
4] specifications of the control function below and above the cutoff of eligibility S*. Optimal bandwidths 
for non-parametric models were computed following a cross-validation method suggested by Imbens and Kalyamaran (2010).   
Outcome: Test scores (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Boys
Mathematics -0.008 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 0.039 0.025 0.036**
[0.029] [0.029] [0.035] [0.035] [0.042] [0.041] [0.015]
Observations 57,637 57,637 57,637 57,637 57,637 57,637 9,319
Spanish -0.072** -0.061** -0.075** -0.066* -0.064 -0.057 -0.111***
[0.028] [0.028] [0.035] [0.034] [0.042] [0.041] [0.012]
Observations 57,637 57,637 57,637 57,637 57,637 57,637 12,828
Overall test score -0.018 -0.014 -0.029 -0.028 -0.005 -0.015 -0.064***
[0.021] [0.021] [0.026] [0.025] [0.031] [0.030] [0.010]
Observations 57,637 57,637 57,637 57,637 57,637 57,637 11,619
Girls
Mathematics -0.041* -0.036 -0.051* -0.049* -0.035 -0.045 -0.132***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.029] [0.029] [0.035] [0.035] [0.021]
Observations 74,087 74,087 74,087 74,087 74,087 74,087 6,992
Spanish -0.024 -0.022 -0.011 -0.012 -0.021 -0.034 -0.073***
[0.024] [0.024] [0.030] [0.030] [0.037] [0.036] [0.019]
Observations 74,087 74,087 74,087 74,087 74,087 74,087 8,119
Overall test score -0.024 -0.026 -0.021 -0.025 -0.011 -0.028 -0.068***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.021] [0.021] [0.026] [0.025] [0.011]
Observations 74,087 74,087 74,087 74,087 74,087 74,087 12,881
Urban
Mathematics 0.019 0.026 0.020 0.019 0.006 -0.011 -0.063***
[0.028] [0.028] [0.034] [0.034] [0.042] [0.042] [0.019]
Observations 64,036 64,036 64,036 64,036 64,036 64,036 9,076
Spanish 0.003 0.020 0.014 0.022 0.024 0.024 0.018
[0.027] [0.027] [0.033] [0.033] [0.042] [0.041] [0.025]
Observations 64,036 64,036 64,036 64,036 64,036 64,036 4,443
Overall test score 0.020 0.034* 0.032 0.037 0.030 0.018 -0.017
[0.020] [0.020] [0.024] [0.024] [0.031] [0.030] [0.014]
Observations 64,036 64,036 64,036 64,036 64,036 64,036 8,413
Rural
Mathematics -0.057** -0.060** -0.063** -0.051 -0.048 -0.064* -0.017
[0.028] [0.027] [0.032] [0.032] [0.039] [0.039] [0.011]
Observations 65,523 65,523 65,523 65,523 65,523 65,523 8,925
Spanish -0.072*** -0.077*** -0.092*** -0.075** -0.090** -0.102*** -0.154***
[0.028] [0.027] [0.032] [0.033] [0.040] [0.039] [0.012]
Observations 65,523 65,523 65,523 65,523 65,523 65,523 14,116
Overall test score -0.056*** -0.064*** -0.087*** -0.074*** -0.066** -0.084*** -0.065***
[0.020] [0.020] [0.023] [0.023] [0.029] [0.028] [0.011]










Table 9. Continuity Checks for Preprogram Household and Individual Level Variables 
 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors reported in square bracket. Significant at 90(*), 95(**), 99(***) percent confidence. Regressions include quartic specifications of the control 
function below and above the cutoff of eligibility S*. Optimal bandwidths were computed following a cross-validation method suggested by Imbens and Kalyamaran (2010). 
Variable Imbens 0.25 points Variable Imbens 0.25 points Variable Imbens 0.25 points
Household size -0.145*** 0.470 Social Security 0.012 -0.039 Fridge  -0.01 0.092*
[0.054] [0.322] [0.013] [0.066] [0.009] [0.052]
Observations 26,970 9,907 498,138 9,907 23,608 9,897
Kids 0.046* 0.290 Farmer 0.001 0.014 Dining  -0.007 -0.029
[0.028] [0.183] [0.002] [0.009] [0.010] [0.043]
Observations 34,368 9,907 15,660 9,907 16,077 9,907
Household head age -0.168 -0.657 Male -0.002 0.030 Bed 0.015 0.033
[0.193] [1.560] [0.014] [0.084] [0.028] [0.134]
Observations 55,962 9,907 24,477 9,907 18,764 9,907
Household head male 0.016 0.017 Age -0.007 -0.062 Owner 0.039** -0.056
[0.012] [0.064] [0.080] [0.476] [0.017] [0.077]
Observations 20,076 9,907 34,045 9,907 16,608 9,907
Household head education -0.033 0.120 Regular Activity 0.087 0.117
[0.029] [0.187] [0.060] [0.379]
Observations 30,456 9,886 35,097 9,907
Partner education -0.039 0.060
[0.025] [0.206]
Observations 32,181 7,749
Married household -0.011 -0.033
[0.014] [0.070]
Observations 23,186 9,907
Household variables Characteristics of the house Individual variables43 
 
 
Figure 1. Effects of the SISBEN Score on Participation in the Program 
 
Notes: The X axis presents the normalized distance of each child’s proxy-means score to the 
cutoff that is used to classify households as SISBEN 1 and determines eligibility to the 
program. The Y axis presents the program participation probability. 
 
Figure 2. Impacts of FA on High School Completion (RD Analysis) 
 
Notes: The X axis presents the normalized distance of each child’s proxy-means score to the 
cutoff that is used to classify households as SISBEN 1 and determines eligibility to the 
program. The Y axis presents the probability of the child completing high school. 
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Figure 4. Distribution of the SISBEN Score  

















































































Appendix A -- Data Merging Procedures 
 
 
Propensity Score Matching. The propensity score matching exercise builds on the short- and middle-
term evaluation and utilizes data from the survey collected in 2002 (There are more than 10,000 
households,and51,056 individuals who were seven years or older at the baseline. This sample is merged 
with the ICFES database of around 6 million registrants between 2000 and 2009 to obtain their test scores 
and estimate whether they have completed high school. The ICFES tests are administered in Colombia 
twice a year - October and May – and are used as a pre-requisite for enrollment into tertiary education. 
The majority of students who took the ICFES tests (90 percent) have finished their 11
th grade and around 
90 percent of high school graduates take the test so the test registration is a good estimator for secondary 
school graduation (World Bank, 1993; Angrist et al., 2006). Although the ICFES exam takers in 2000 and 
2001 could not have participated in the FA, which started in 2002, they are kept in the dataset because 
they may include older siblings of FA participants for the analysis of the program indirect effects.  
 
Since one of the relevant outcomes is high school completion, different merging strategies are used to 
enhance the probability of finding the surveyed individuals in the ICFES database, making sure that 
relevant people are not excluded. If an individual is not matched to any ICFES registration, it is assumed 
that the child did not take the test, either because they did not finish 11
th grade or because they chose not 
to. The latter is more unlikely because of the high proportion of secondary school graduates that take the 
ICFES exam (Angrist et al., 2006). There are many difficulties in matching the sampled children with the 
ICFES registration. However, there is no reason to believe that the matching errors, often due to name and 
ID mismatches, would be systematically different between the treatment and control groups. 
 
Four different merging methods are employed:  
 
•  The first method uses only the ID numbers reported in the surveys as the matching criterion. This is a 
unique ID number assigned to all citizens of Colombia when they turn 11-12 years old. However, the 
ID numbers change when individuals turn 18, which may result in the failure to match individuals 
who took the ICFES test at or after 18 years of age. Furthermore, since an ID includes 11 digits, there 
are, expectedly, many occasions of IDs being misreported in the evaluation surveys. This merge, 
consequentially, gives only 4,048 matched observations.  
•  The second method uses only full name as the matching criterion with the probability of 
orthographical mistakes (for instance, Catherine vs. Katherine). While this may resolve the issue of ID 
change or misreporting as observed in the first method, it has some potential mismatches due to a 
number of common last names in Colombia. It is therefore important to be cautious of the likelihood 
of matching different individuals with the same name. This merge results in 6,563 matches.  
•  The third method uses both the two last names and date of birth for merging. Again, due to many 
common last names in Colombia, this method does not guarantee unique matches. The merge provides 
46,360 observations.  




children under 18 years of age, the first 6 digits correspond to the date of birth so this strategy is 
potentially more accurate than the third method of using last names and date of birth. With shorter 
IDs, it is also expected that there are fewer misreporting cases than in the first method. However, since 
the short ID numbers are not unique, this strategy has similar issue with the full name merge. It 
provides 5,927matches.  
The results from all four matches are used to minimize the probability of exclusion. In order to ensure that 
the matches are correct, the four merges are appended and subject to three cleaning processes. First, the 
                                                           
39 The IDs distributed before 2004 have 9 digits. We used 7 digits in order to maximize the number of merges we could get.  48 
 
records with the exact name and similar date of birth are kept (either the same date and month of birth and 
within four years of birth, or the same year of birth and within two months and two days of birth). Second, 
those that do not fulfill the first check are tested whether they have the exact date of birth and similar 
name (again, to account for orthographical mistakes). Finally, among those that fail both tests, the 
observations with similar name and similar date of birth are kept to account for mistakes in recording.  
After each cleaning, duplicates are checked within both the evaluation survey sample and the ICFES 
dataset. Only the duplicates across both datasets are deleted to avoid eliminating individuals that took the 
exam multiple times. The result is 5,022 observations. When multiple test scores are found for one 
individual, the first test result is kept, which produces 4,820 records corresponding to unique individuals. 
This final data set makes up the sample used in the analysis.  
 
The accuracy of the merges is tested using the information on students enrolled in schools in the 
evaluation surveys. This test follows the cohorts of students who in principle could have completed the 
11
th grade between 2000 and 2009, assuming no grade repetition, and obtains 5,395 records. Again, this 
includes students who could have finished high school in 2000 and 2001 since they serve as the analysis 
group for another outcome. Incorporating the average dropout rates of students from grades 7 to 11, there 
should be 4,073 individuals who completed the 11
th grade within this time period. The final sample of 
4,820 individuals obtained from the merging and cleaning process comes quite close to this estimate.   
Among the 4,820 matched individuals, 3,002 have exactly the same full name and date of birth. Among 
the 5,022 matched records, 67 percent are 18 years old or younger and 88 percent are under 20 at the time 
they took the test. Most of the observations correspond to tests taken in the second semester of the year 
when public schools administer the exam, which is consistent with the fact that most of FA beneficiaries 
attend public schools.  
 
Regression Discontinuity Design. As for the RD analysis, the merge uses three set of administrative data: 
(1) the System of Information of Beneficiaries of the program (SIFA) provided by Acción Social; (2) the 
Poverty Index Score Survey collected between 1994 and 2003 (SISBEN); and (3) records on registration 
for the national ICFES test. The following steps describe the use of these data: 
 
•  SIFA is used to construct the treatment groups whereas SISBEN provides the control group  – 
individuals under and above the threshold of eligibility, respectively. 
•  After running the same merging procedures followed in the PSM analysis, the merge is able to 
identify that 95 percent of the matching distribution was born between the years of 1975 and 1994.  
This information is used to restrict the sample to those individual that are mostly likely to be merged 
between SIFA+SISBEN and ICFES. 
•  The analysis focuses on information from the SISBEN survey that was collected between 1994 and 
2003, since FA targeted the beneficiaries during the first phase of the program with the scores from 
the first version of the poverty score index.  For consistency of result, the sample is restricted in this 
way to evaluate comparable children who joined the program during the first expansion that took 
place between 2002 and 2003; these children come from the records of SIFA in 2001-06. 
•  The same four merging strategies employed in the PSM analysis were followed to guarantee the 
comparability of the outcome variable that measures secondary school completion.  
•  Individuals with score zero were excluded from the analysis for two reasons: First, it is not possible to 
establish whether a score zero is the result of a problem in the algorithm -- the probability of getting 0 
is very low. Second, the probability of getting FA is much lower for this group when compared with 
the probability of receiving the treatment for people with scores equal to one. 
 49 
 
Appendix B – Methodology for Nonparametric Bounds of Program Impacts 
 
This paper uses the results of ICFES, a mandatory academic test given to students in school, to infer the 
impacts of FA on learning outcome. Such approach is problematic from a methodological standpoint 
because the program increases school enrollment and attendance among beneficiaries and with it the 
probability that they take the exam. Participant children are therefore more likely than nonparticipants to 
register for the ICFES test, which makes the scores distributions of beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries not 
comparable. The intuition behind this is a selection bias created by the ‘marginal’ child who is brought 
into school due to the incentives of the program and may be different in many dimensions (socio-
economic background, inner ability, motivation, expected returns to schooling, etc.) than those already 
enrolled in school. For these reasons, a simple comparison of participant and nonparticipant children may 
be deceptive and – given that the bias is expected to be negative – would probably underestimate the 
actual effect of the program on learning.  
 
In order to address this identification issue, this evaluation uses bounding procedures on specific quantile 
average treatment effects estimated with matching techniques to correct for the selection bias brought 
about by the likely introduction of low-scorers into the group of program beneficiaries who ended up 
taking the test (Lee, 2002; Angrist et al., 2006). The two key assumptions of the procedure are: (1) 
independence of the treatment status and the errors in the outcome and selection equations (expected to be 
addressed by the PSM strategy); (2) a monotonicity condition in the sense that assignment to treatment 
affects the outcome in only one direction, namely that the program does not reduce the test scores of 
program participants:  
𝑆1𝑖  ≥ 𝑆0𝑖 for all i 
 
where 𝑆, 1 and i denote test scores, treatment status and individuals, respectively. Following Angrist and 
others (2006), students are assumed to choose to take the test if their expected scores are above a certain 
threshold so that the quantiles of test-takers are identified from the quantiles of non-takers (𝑆𝑡𝑘 = 0 where 
𝑡 = 0,1 indexes treated and control children and k equals 1 if the student takes the test) for 𝜑 ≥ 𝜑𝑘, where 
𝑞𝑘(𝜑𝑘) = 0. The 𝜑-quantile of the distributions of non-participants and participants are denoted by 
𝑞0(𝜑0) and 𝑞1(𝜑1), respectively.  
 
The main idea of the procedure is to find the quantile 𝜑0 for the control group such that 𝑞0(𝜑0) = 0 and 
restrict the distribution of 𝑆1 to the percentiles above 𝜑0. This defines the upper bound based on the 
subsample of individuals who would have taken the test regardless of the program 𝐸[𝑆1 − 𝑆0|𝑘 = 1] as 
follows: 
𝐸[𝑆|𝐷 = 1,𝑆 > 𝑞0(𝜑)] −  𝐸[𝑆|𝐷 = 0,𝑆 > 𝑞0(𝜑)] 
 
Unadjusted comparisons between treated and control children – conditional on positive test scores for 
each group – provide lower bounds on the actual effects of the program: 
 
𝐸[𝑆|𝐷 = 1,𝑆 > 𝑞1(𝜑)] −  𝐸[𝑆|𝐷 = 0,𝑆 > 𝑞0(𝜑)] 
 
Since the problem of selection is expected to be more prevalent at the bottom of the distribution, upper 
bounds should be tighter at upper parts of the distribution. Angrist (1997) shows that under the 
assumptions (1) and (2), the symmetric truncation of the score distributions is expected to eliminate the 
sample selection bias. As noted above, this equivalent to restricting the sample to the individuals thought 
to be the ‘always takers’   
 